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Love, Poetry, and the Good Life:  
Mill’s Autobiography & Perfectionist Ethics1 
Samuel Clark 
Abstract 
I argue for a perfectionist reading of Mill’s account of the good life, by using the failures 
of development recorded in his Autobiography as a way to understand his official account 
of happiness in Utilitarianism. This work offers both a new perspective on Mill’s thought, 
and a distinctive account of the role of aesthetic and emotional capacities in the most 
choiceworthy human life. I consider the philosophical purposes of autobiography, Mill’s 
disagreements with Bentham, and the nature of competent judges and the pleasure they 
take in higher culture. I conclude that Millian perfectionism is an attractive and 
underappreciated option for contemporary value theory. 
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I. Introduction 
What is Mill’s account of the good life, and is it of any use to us? Both of these questions 
invite obvious answers: first, Mill is a complex hedonist. That is, he agrees with Bentham 
that the good life—the life which goes best for the person whose life it is, which is most 
choiceworthy for those we care about including ourselves2—is the life which has the 
greatest possible balance of pleasure over pain. Mill differs from Bentham’s simple 
hedonism only in thinking that Bentham’s list of good-makers for pleasures is 
incomplete: pleasures can be evaluated and compared not only by intensity, duration, 
etc.3, but also by their distinctive phenomenal quality. That quality can be distinguished 
by competent judges of pleasure: people who have experience of different kinds of 
pleasure, who can therefore make authoritative pairwise comparisons between pleasures. 
Mill further claims that such judges will choose, and thus identify as more valuable, the 
higher pleasures of elite culture—poetry, philosophy, active citizenship—over the lower 
pleasures of consumption, spectacle, and selfishness.4 
 But—turning to my second question—this account is implausible, not least 
because the higher/lower pleasures distinction encapsulates Victorian cultural prejudice, 
not anything about humans in general. Mill might have preferred Wordsworth to music 
hall and the debating society to the pub; I might prefer Keith Jarrett to Britney Spears 
and Evelyn Waugh to Dan Brown; but these are at best idiosyncrasies of taste and 
upbringing, and perhaps revelations of class-conscious snobbery. So, Mill’s account of 
the good life should be rejected. Hedonism is a minority position in contemporary value 
theory, but even those who hold it5 reject Mill’s version of it. 
 My alternative answers to these questions are: Mill can profitably be read as a 
perfectionist; Millian perfectionism is an appealing account of the good life for us. For 
Mill on this reading, the good life is the life in which one fully develops and uses one’s 
human and individual potential; in which one’s distinctive capacities are brought to full 
expression; in which one flourishes as a human being and as the particular person one is. 
Just as the successful life for an oak is to grow from acorn to healthy, spreading tree, so 
the best life for a human is to grow into flourishing adulthood. Mill’s use for us is that he 
reveals some of the particular capacities which constitute flourishing—for humans, not 
just for Victorian do-gooders (like Mill) or the sons of bourgeois academic households 
(like me). In what follows, I make my case for those answers by offering a rereading of 
Mill’s Autobiography. 
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II. Purposes of Autobiography 
An autobiography is not just a record of events or a transparent window into a character. 
Like all self-narrations, autobiographies shape the narrator as well as being shaped by 
her; like all public speech-acts, published autobiographies are intended to do things to 
and with their audiences. People write autobiographies for reasons, and those reasons 
shape what they reveal and what they don’t, and what they mean to do with their own life 
stories. For instance: an autobiography can be an attempt at self-justification (think of 
Rousseau’s Confessions), or an attempt to understand and tame some transforming life 
event (think of Robert Graves’s Goodbye to All That), or a moral and political intervention 
(think of Frederick Douglass’s Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, An American Slave).  
 Mill’s Autobiography is openly intended to have more than personal significance6. 
In its first paragraph, he writes that ‘I do not for a moment imagine that any part of what 
I have to relate can be interesting to the public as a narrative or as being connected with 
myself’7. Mill doesn’t think anyone would be interested in his life just as his, and 
repeatedly insists that he’s nothing special. As he later says about his intellectual 
achievements: ‘What I could do, could assuredly be done by any boy or girl of average 
capacity and healthy physical constitution’8. Mill writes, as he presents it, with three 
purposes in mind. First, ‘I have thought that in an age in which education and its 
improvement are the subject of more, if not of profounder, study than at any former 
period of English history, it may be useful that there should be some record of an 
education which was unusual and remarkable’9. Mill intends to weigh the success and 
failure of his father’s educational theory as it was tried out on him. Second, ‘It has also 
seemed to me that in an age of transition in opinions, there may be somewhat both of 
interest and of benefit in noting the successive phases of any mind which was always 
pressing forward’10. Third, ‘But a motive which weighs more with me than either of 
these, is a desire to make acknowledgment of the debts which my intellectual and moral 
development owes to other persons; some of them of recognized eminence, others less 
known than they deserve to be, and the one to whom most of all is due, one whom the 
world had no opportunity of knowing’11. Mill also intends to acknowledge his debts to 
the major shapers of his growth: his father, Bentham, Romantics like Wordsworth and 
Carlyle, and—most importantly—his lover and eventual wife Harriet Taylor. 
 The thread that runs through all three of these reasons for writing is 
development: human development, not just Mill’s development. Autobiography’s topic is 
the ways in which a human—‘any boy or girl’—can be cultivated, grow, and flower; or 
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can fail to grow, and be left stunted and incomplete. My suggestion is that Mill is using 
his own life as an exemplar for a general account of the good life and of the social and 
personal conditions which are necessary to it. Autobiography dramatizes a perfectionist 
account of the good life, with Mill’s own life as example and warning. It’s an example, 
because that life shows what development is possible with the right educational 
conditions; but it’s also a warning, because it also shows the ways in which development 
can be thwarted, and a human life made worse than it might have been. A perfectionist 
ethic must answer the question, which capacities are those whose full expression and use 
constitute flourishing? I’m now going to follow Mill in focusing on failures of 
development as a way of answering that question. 
III. Failures of Development 
The warning element in Autobiography is Mill’s description of the parts of flourishing 
which his early life and education failed to cultivate. Mill was intensively educated at 
home to be the best possible advocate for James Mill and Bentham’s greatest happiness 
principle, and for the radical social, legal and political change it demanded. By the time 
he was in his twenties, he was extraordinarily active for that cause as a journalist, 
lobbyist, and organizer. But then came the crash: 
It was in the autumn of 1826. I was in a dull state of nerves, such as everybody is 
occasionally liable to; unsusceptible to enjoyment or pleasurable excitement; one of 
those moods when what is pleasure at other times, becomes insipid or indifferent; the 
state, I should think, in which converts to Methodism usually are, when smitten by 
their first ‘conviction of sin.’ In this frame of mind it occurred to me to put the 
question directly to myself, ‘Suppose that all your objects in life were realized; that all 
the changes in institutions and opinions which you are looking forward to, could be 
completely effected at this very instant: would this be a great joy and happiness to 
you?’ And an irrepressible self-consciousness distinctly answered, ‘No!’ At this my 
heart sank within me: the whole foundation on which my life was constructed fell 
down. All my happiness was to have been found in the continual pursuit of this end. 
The end had ceased to charm, and how could there ever again be any interest in the 
means? I seemed to have nothing left to live for.12 
Mill’s resulting period of dejection changes his views about the proper goals of his own 
action and of human action. He is still a consequentialist and a welfarist—he still thinks 
that good consequences are ultimately all that justify action, and that the measure of 
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good consequences is how well individual lives go—but his understanding of how an 
individual life can go well, or go badly, has changed. His own failures reveal previously 
unimagined possibilities for success. 
Mill’s description of his crisis, repudiation of his early projects, and eventual 
recovery, dramatizes two particular failures of development. First, a failure of aesthetic 
capacity: Mill’s crisis was importantly an inability to find pleasure even in those things—
books, music, debate—which he’d previously enjoyed. Second, a failure of emotional or 
sympathetic capacity. Mill’s upbringing left him with a limited ability to respond 
emotionally to, for instance, his father: 
The element which was chiefly deficient in his moral relation to his children was that 
of tenderness. I do not believe that this deficiency lay in his own nature. I believe him 
to have had much more feeling than he habitually showed, and much greater 
capacities of feeling than were ever developed. He resembled most Englishmen in 
being ashamed of the signs of feeling, and, by the absence of demonstration, starving 
the feelings themselves. If we consider further that he was in the trying position of 
sole teacher, and add to this that his temper was constitutionally irritable, it is 
impossible not to feel true pity for a father who did, and strove to do, so much for his 
children, who would have so valued their affection, yet who must have been 
constantly feeling that fear of him was drying it up at its source. This was no longer 
the case later in life, and with his younger children. They loved him tenderly: and if I 
cannot say so much of myself, I was always loyally devoted to him.13 
James Mill stunted himself, and as a result stunted John Stuart Mill in his turn. 
What these aesthetic and sympathetic capacities share is that they’re sensitivities or 
perceptual capacities: they are capacities to be affected by features of the world, which can 
be more or less discriminating, penetrating, and resistant to distortion; which can more 
or less accurately and minutely engage with the world; which can be developed by 
practice, and starved by disuse. Mill calls them ‘pleasurable susceptibilities’14. It’s 
significant that Mill presents his crisis itself not (merely) as an upwelling of unhappy 
feeling, but rather as a crisis of sensitivity. He records it as a double shift in perception: 
on one hand, a failure to be moved or affected—a dulling or suspension or wearing away of 
the feelings. On the other hand, an inchoate sharpening of perception which reveals his 
then-current pursuits as unsatisfactory: the crisis is precipitated by an irrepressible self-
consciousness—a form of self-observation—which reveals that attaining his goals wouldn’t 
make his life meaningful. His gradual recovery is both the recovery and sharpening of the 
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capacities to be emotionally and aesthetically affected, and the discovery of appropriate 
objects on which to practice those capacities. 
The most obvious of these objects is poetry: Wordsworth broke through Mill’s 
despair by addressing ‘one of the strongest of my pleasurable susceptibilities, the love of 
rural objects and natural scenery’ and expressing ‘states of feeling, and of thought 
coloured by feeling, under the excitement of beauty’15. But perhaps the most important 
of these ways of practicing appropriate feeling was Harriet Taylor: ‘an extremely 
emotional person who [was] very skilled at circumnavigating John’s intellectual 
defenses’16. The general, not merely personal lesson Mill draws is that ‘the cultivation of 
the feelings became one of the cardinal points in my ethical and philosophical creed’17. 
My suggestion is that Mill’s account of these failures and cultivations of perceptual 
capacities is an account of (at least some of) those central human capacities, the 
possession and use of which constitute flourishing. Successful development of these 
aesthetic and emotional perceptual capacities—the cultivation of the feelings—is 
necessary to successful human life. We need to be able to have, and to appreciate, love 
and poetry; to have and appreciate love and poetry, we need to develop emotional and 
aesthetic sensibilities.  
I have so far used the notion of sensibility casually; it needs some explanation, 
which I’ll now offer via some analogies with other elements of human experience. I 
intend what follows not as a definition, but as a reminder: a way of calling to the reader’s 
attention what I expect already to be familiar. 
A sensibility, first, is close to a perceptual capacity. Like such capacities—sight, 
hearing, etc.—an aesthetic, emotional, or other sensibility is a way of coming to know the 
world from outside in, and not wholly voluntary: I would prefer not to hear the 
awfulness of an advertising jingle, but it imposes itself on my attention, just as thunder 
might. This is the analogy I have exploited above, and will continue to use below. But 
sensibilities are not exactly like perceptual capacities, in that they do not rely on 
‘dedicated input systems’18. Humans typically have sound-specific sensory pathways, but 
not beauty-specific or anger-specific ones. In this, sensibilities are more like emotions 
than like senses. Anger, for instance, is a not-wholly-voluntary response to the world 
which involves no dedicated input, but is rather a way of taking sensory and other inputs. 
Being angry, I take certain elements of the experienced world—a tone of voice, a 
remembered event, a character—as valenced, that is as having value19. Listening to an 
advertising jingle, I experience and judge it as bad: I hear it as ugly and irritating, not just as 
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a series of tones. Listening to ‘Flamenco Sketches’20, I hear it as beautiful. But, finally, 
sensibilities are unlike emotions in being trainable by practice: in this, they are more like 
skills. A skill is improved by repeatedly engaging in the skilled activity, typically motivated 
by pleasure in doing so; similarly, sensibilities are sharpened by pleasurable use (although, 
as Aristotle points out, practice can degrade as well as cultivate if it goes badly). 
‘Flamenco Sketches’ can be heard, initially, as just a pleasant noise—an appealing aural 
surface. That pleasure motivates repeated listening, closer attention, and engagement 
with what’s related to its object (other music by Miles Davis and by John Coltrane, Bill 
Evans, Cannonball Adderley et al.; further jazz and modal music; criticism, biography, 
history). Repeated listening and further engagement deepens the perception and 
understanding of the music: it takes the listener under the surface into the structure of 
the piece, and reveals the workings of Davis and his band-members’ performance. The 
developed musical sensibility reveals the detail of the piece’s beauty: the specific ways in 
which it is good. 
Sensibilities, then, are closely allied to several other features of our psychology and 
physiology: they are like perceptual capacities in being not-wholly-voluntary ways of 
coming to know the world; like emotions in being ways of taking the world as valenced; 
and like skills in being trainable by practice. In a phrase, we could say that sensibilities are 
skilled passions. The development of aesthetic and emotional sensibilities understood in 
this way is, on my reading of Mill, central to the successful human life, but I now need to 
deal with an objection to that reading. 
IV. An Objection 
At this point, the reader may want to object that this doesn’t show that Mill is a 
perfectionist. Even accepting that Autobiography reveals Mill’s account of the good life, 
the account it reveals is hedonistic: the good life involves a mutually-reinforcing relation 
between desire and pleasure, with pleasure as the value-giving element. On this 
alternative interpretation of his crisis, Mill begins with one set of desires, to be a reformer 
of the world as his father and Bentham intended; he gets pleasure from satisfying them; 
and he therefore continues to pursue those goals. But then—for whatever reason—the 
connection breaks. He can no longer get pleasure from his activism, and so activism 
becomes worthless to him: he has nothing left to live for. Luckily, Mill eventually finds 
some other desires and pleasures—love and poetry—to sustain him. On this reading, it 
doesn’t matter what our desires are desires for, so long as we have some, and take 
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pleasure in their satisfaction. The good life is the life where we want things, get them, 
and are thereby made happy. If the things we want are love and poetry, that’s fine; but 
they could just as meaningfully have been Mill’s pre-crisis political goals; or fame and 
fortune; or cosy obscurity; or stamp-collecting. What matters is wanting and the 
sensation of getting, not what we want and get pleasure from. Or, if this seems not to 
respect the developmental nature of Mill’s account, we can agree that what we get 
pleasure from is not random, but perhaps follows some developmental trajectory from 
childish to adult tastes: as Mill got older, political activism lost its relish and the homely 
comforts of reading and affection started to seem more attractive, just as part of growing 
up is losing one’s sweet tooth and acquiring a taste for olives. But that doesn’t tell us 
what’s good: it tells us about the changing causes of good, while good itself can still be 
understood as pleasure, consequent on the satisfaction of desire, where desires are 
matters of mere taste, whether purely idiosyncratic or grounded in developmental facts 
about humans. 
 In response, I suggest that this hedonistic reading doesn’t catch Mill’s own 
experience of his crisis. Mill did not understand what had happened to him as just a 
move from one arbitrary set of desires to another. It was a liberation and a self-
revelation: liberation from his father’s control and from the education which had shaped 
him; revelation of deep-rooted needs which had been starved by that education. On my 
reading of the crisis, Mill begins with an artificial, alien set of desires which can’t sustain 
him. His irrepressible self-consciousness is a moment of self-perception which reveals 
not only the inadequacy of his current goals, but the seeds of better ones. Mill’s pursuit 
of love and poetry—of emotional and aesthetic sensibility—is a matter of vital self-
expression. Although it’s possible to describe what happens to Mill in hedonistic terms, 
those terms leave Mill’s supposed account of the good life unengaged with what he 
himself regarded as a central discovery about how life should be lived. I now show how 
that discovery informs the rest of Mill’s ethics. 
V. Mill’s Ethics Through the Autobiographical Lens 
Taking stock: I’ve argued for reading Mill’s Autobiography as a key to his value theory. 
This reading offers us a Millian perfectionism focused on flourishing, understood as the 
development of particular capacities. The idea that Mill’s account of the good life 
involves the exercise of capacities, not just pleasant mental states, is not new: according 
to David Brink, for instance, Mill holds ‘a conception of human happiness whose 
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dominant component consists in the exercise of one’s rational capacities’21. Wendy 
Donner and Don Habibi have both made related suggestions22. What I think is original 
here is my focus on the development (not just the exercise) of perceptual (not, or not only, 
rational) capacities. 
Seeing Mill’s ethics in this way has a number of interpretative benefits. For one 
example, it allows us to take Mill’s insistence that individuality is a part of well-being at 
face value. Individuality, as Mill uses the concept, is the self-expressive use of developed 
capacities of choice and discrimination, in pursuit of what really suits us as individuals—
it’s what we use and discover in undertaking experiments in living. In On Liberty chapter 
III, Mill is explicit that it is a central part of what makes a life go well, not just a means by 
which an independently-defined good life can be secured23. 
 I want to focus on a different set of interpretative benefits, by returning to the 
issue with which I began: Mill’s dispute with Bentham and the idea of competent judges. 
According to the obvious but mistaken answer to my first question—what is Mill’s 
account of the good life?—Mill is a hedonist who adds quality to Bentham’s list of good-
makers for pleasure. According to my alternative answer, Mill is a perfectionist. What 
does this mean for his account of happiness in chapter II of Utilitarianism? I’ll break that 
question down into four sub-questions. 
First, Who or what are competent judges? Mill explicitly says that they’re people with 
experience of both of two pleasures—say, poetry and pushpin—to be distinguished and 
ranked. I suggest that competent judges are people who have discriminating sensibilities, 
cultivated by practice on appropriate objects, who can therefore feel pleasures deeply and 
accurately. Their authority is therefore evidential, not constitutive, of the value of higher 
pleasures24. Competent judges see poetry as better than pushpin, much as the oil painter 
sees the difference between zinc white and flake white, where the layperson doesn’t. 
They have skilled rather than unskilled passions in particular domains, and they therefore 
know the valenced world better. Their experience is practice—a fallible way of 
developing sensibility—not criterial for correct perception. This explains Mill’s answer to 
an obvious objection: as a matter of fact, people with experience of higher and lower 
pleasures often choose the lower. ‘Many who begin with youthful enthusiasm for 
everything noble, as they advance in years sink into indolence and selfishness’25. Mill 
responds that the ‘capacity for the nobler feelings is in most natures a very tender plant, 
easily killed, not only by hostile influences, but by mere want of sustenance’26. People 
whose experience should lead them to be competent judges, but who choose lower over 
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higher pleasures, have had their sensibilities dulled by abuse, or starved by lack of proper 
objects at crucial stages of development. They haven’t developed properly, or they’ve 
been corrupted. 
So, second, What’s wrong with Bentham’s account of the good life? The same as was 
wrong with him as a human being: ‘It is indispensable to a correct estimate of any of 
Bentham’s dealings with the world, to bear in mind that in everything except abstract 
speculation he was to the last … essentially a boy’27. Bentham never achieved adult 
development in his aesthetic and emotional faculties. He was therefore ‘one-eyed’28: 
unable to see what competent judges see; unable to understand poetry or distinguish it 
from pushpin. Bentham loathed talk of ‘good and bad taste’—because he had no taste.  
Third, what is it that good taste chooses? What is quality in pleasure? On the 
standard reading, quality is a dimension of feeling-tone in a mental state (perhaps 
pleasures are higher or lower as sounds are warm or cold). On my reading, quality is 
whatever features of the world engage the developed sensibility of the competent judge, 
and especially, whatever features not only engage but further develop that sensibility. 
Poetry opens new vistas of pleasure in a way that pushpin doesn’t: there’s certainly 
pleasure to be had in playing a game well, not least the pleasure of absorption in skilled 
activity for its own sake29; but it compares unfavourably to the deepening pleasure 
involved, for instance, in getting to know ‘Flemenco Sketches’ well; or in starting with a 
vague fondness for that poem about a medieval tomb, reading it alongside the rest of 
Larkin’s The Whitsun Weddings, moving on to his High Windows, and then to his earlier 
poetry, influences, contemporaries, followers, and critics30.  
 Finally, What is pleasure? For Bentham, pleasure is a simple, familiar mental state, 
typically and contingently caused by the external factors categorized in Introduction to the 
Principles of Morals and Legislation chapter III, but which could in theory be caused by non-
standard factors like experience machines. For Mill—I suggest—pleasure is the 
engagement of skilled passion with the world. What’s important is the exercise of a 
developed sensibility in taking pleasure in things with real qualities which can engage and 
sharpen that sensibility, not (or not only) the mental states which taking pleasure 
involves. This last thought is made clearer by an analogy with Peter Goldie’s account of 
emotion31. Goldie makes a distinction between an episode of emotional experience—the stab 
of intense feeling when she giggles at something he’s just whispered to her—and an 
emotion—jealousy, which is complex, episodic, structured over time, and which involves 
many different mental states, dispositions to act, and activities. Jealousy involves, but is a 
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lot more than, a stab of jealous feeling. Similarly, I want to distinguish between episodes of 
pleasurable experience—the first sip of my pint—and taking pleasure—taking a good book to 
a beer garden and spending the afternoon reading and writing. Episodes of pleasurable 
experience are part of taking pleasure, but not all of it. Taking pleasure in this enriched 
sense both requires and helps further to cultivate the sensibilities which reveal the 
qualities of pleasure’s objects. 
 The idea running through all four of these answers is that the development and 
expression of aesthetic and emotional sensibility both is a part of human flourishing, and 
is the development of the senses of value which allow us to identify the elements of 
human flourishing—including themselves—as good. There are two classes of benefit in 
seeing Mill’s account of the good life, and its relation to pleasure, in this way: first, the 
interpretative benefits canvassed above, which explain some otherwise puzzling features 
of Mill’s texts (like his answer to the problem of experienced judges who choose lower 
pleasures) and offer answers to standard objections (like the experience machine). I now 
move to the second class of benefits, which are for our understanding of the good life, 
rather than our understanding of Mill. 
VI. Millian Perfectionism 
I began with two questions—What is Mill’s account of the good life, and is it of any use 
to us?—and have so far concentrated on the first. I’ve reread Mill’s Autobiography as a 
perfectionist account of the good life, which uses Mill’s own life as a dramatic example 
and warning. I take Mill’s failures of development to be particularly significant: those 
failures are in the development of sensibilities: liabilities to be affected by the world, which 
can be more or less deep and precise, and which can be educated or corrupted by 
practice. This reading of Mill’s account of the good life is a key to understanding his 
ethics. My main example of that key in use is Mill’s notorious idea of higher pleasures 
and competent judges, whom I’ve revealed as flourishing human beings with the 
discriminating sensibilities which are necessary to respond to the subtle gradations of 
quality in the objects of pleasure, and the development and use of which partly constitute 
the good life. The point of this work wasn’t just historical: it was to reveal Autobiography 
as an important ethical resource—a clue to the nature of the good life in its human 
complexity. I now want to turn briefly to my second question, and ask what we should 
take away from Millian perfectionism. 
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 As is presumably already obvious, I think that Mill is right to emphasize aesthetic 
and emotional sensibilities as parts of flourishing. The best, most choiceworthy life for 
those we care about, including ourselves, requires their development and expression. 
Love and poetry are good for us: if we fail to develop the capacities to appreciate them, 
or if those capacities are corrupted in us, our lives go badly. I haven’t exactly argued for 
that conclusion, being unsure how such an argument would go, but I have attempted to 
display these elements of flourishing in a way which I hope resonates with my reader’s 
experience. To see what this discovery offers to us, it’s worth putting it into its wider 
contemporary context as part of the ethical theory of perfectionism. 
 Perfectionism is one answer to the fundamental moral and political question, 
How should one live?, and addresses that question with an account of the nature and the 
significance of the good. The good is human flourishing, that is the full development and 
successful performance of whatever ways of being and functioning are of central 
importance in human life: one’s life goes best when she expresses human and individual 
potential to the full. The significance of the good, so understood, is that it is the primary 
and independent ethical concept, from which the right is derived. The perfectionist, like 
the utilitarian, is a consequentialist; but like the virtue theorist, she denies that the good 
consists solely in mental states or in the satisfaction of preferences. Human good is to be 
promoted, but there are things which are good for humans, regardless of whether we 
want or enjoy them. The perfectionist’s account of the central human ways of being and 
functioning is grounded in an account of natural human development and its distortions, 
and this ground makes sense of the metaphors, which I’ve used throughout this paper, of 
growth, flourishing, corruption, and stuntedness. Two obvious questions follow for the 
perfectionist: first, Which are the ways of being and functioning, the development and use 
of which constitute flourishing? What does a flourishing human possess and do? Second, 
How are we to promote human flourishing? What are its conditions of cultivation?32 
 One example of an answer to the first question, with implications for the second, 
is Brad Hooker’s offer of pleasure, desire-satisfaction (of at least some desires), 
friendship, knowledge, achievement, and autonomy as the elements of the good life33. 
James Griffin, for another example, suggests accomplishment, agency, understanding, 
enjoyment, and deep personal relations34. The work I have done here both adds to such 
lists, and suggests a promising method for justifying them. The method I have adopted is 
to reread Mill’s Autobiography as an effort to see a life as a single developmental process 
involving successes and failures: that is, as a dramatisation both of Mill’s self-
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understanding and of his understanding of human life. The contrast here is with the 
method of thought-experiments adopted by many other moral philosophers. Daniel 
Haybron’s recent The Pursuit of Unhappiness, for one instance among many, often makes 
its points by describing fictional characters—Angela the diplomat, who must choose 
between a well-earned retirement and a demanding new job, amongst others35. Such 
fictions can be helpful in making distinctions and in eliciting or putting pressure on 
intuitions, but lack the empirical weight of actual lives put under the spotlight of their 
owners’ self-attention. If the perfectionist is right that humans have a natural 
developmental path which is not wholly up to us, we need to discover, not to invent it; 
our intuitions about it may be mistaken; and our best resources for discovery and 
correction are actual human lives as lived and understood. 
 A method is best tested by its results, of course, so I’ll finish by revisiting the two 
elements of flourishing which a rereading of Mill’s Autobiography as ethics reveals to us. 
Our capacities for love and poetry, as I’ve called them, are forms of sensibility: complex 
capacities which reveal features of the world to us, and make us available to be 
transformatively affected by those features. Emotional sensibility is the capacity for deep 
engagement with another person—to see them clearly as loved and loving, to feel with 
them, and to be shaped and changed by them. Aesthetic sensibility is the capacity for 
deep engagement with aesthetic objects (poetry, music or painting, for instance)—to see 
them precisely and to be shaped and changed by them. Both sensibilities are like skills in 
being developed by practice, and their development and expression is part of the best 
kind of life—that is, part of the life which we would choose for those we care about, if it 
were up to us. To see this, we can imagine lives without these features—would we be 
satisfied if our children never made any deep friendships?—or, better, read about real 
failures of development in—for instance—Mill’s Autobiography. 
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